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COMMENTARY

THE CONTINUING PROBLEM OF
STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS IN SECTION
1983 CASES: IS THE ANSWER OUT AT
SEA?
ROBERT

M. JARVIS* AND JUDITH ANNE JARVIS**
I.

INTRODUCTION

When Congress enacted the Civil Rights Act of 1871,' it expected that the Act would increase significantly the federal judiciary's caseload. 2 Since one of the primary purposes3 of the Act was to
provide a federal forum for those who claimed that their civil rights
had been abridged by persons acting "under color of state law,"' the
* B.A., Northwestern University; J.D., University of Pennsylvania, LL.M., New
York University. Assistant Professor of Law, Nova University.
** B.A., New York University; J.D. candidate, University of Miami. Editor-inChief, University of Miami Inter-American Law Review
1. Civil Rights Act, 17 Stat. 13, (1871) (codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982))
[hereinafter section 1983].
2. An extensive discussion of the legislative history of section 1983 can be found
in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The passages cited in that case from the
CONGREssIoNAL GLOBE indicate that both supporters and opponents of the Act anticipated that it would become a popular and much-used tool. In any event, since the Act
was intended to provide a remedy where state laws had proved inadequate or had
been unequally applied it seems likely that Congress hoped to encourage the bringing
of lawsuits by suitors who had been discouraged by the state laws.
3. The three principal purposes of the Act, as articulated by its supporters,
were: 1) to override certain state laws; 2) to provide a remedy where state laws were
inadequate; and 3) to provide an additional remedy to supplement adequate state
remedies when the implementation of such remedies proved impractical. Monroe, 365
U.S. at 173-74.
4. Section 1983 reads, in relevant part, as follows:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes
to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).

The John Marshall Law Review

[Vol. 22:285

Act by its very nature was designed to encourage federal litigation.
What Congress failed to foresee, however, was the chaos which
would be created by its failure to include a statute of limitations for
claims brought under section 1983. In attempting to divine an appropriate statute of limitations,5 the federal courts have created a
confusing patchwork of decisions, with disagreement rampant both
within and among the circuits.'
Adding to the confusion is section 1988, 7 which has been interpreted as authorizing the "borrowing" of state law to fill in the gaps
of section 1983.8 Problematically, section 1988 does not provide
guidance as to the proper approach in choosing which state laws to
borrow. As a result, the Supreme Court has been required on several
occasions in the past fifty years to decide a host of issues relating to
the operation of section 1983. Among the issues which the Court has
faced have been: (a) whether section 1983 is procedural, substantive,
or both;9 (b) whether state statutes of limitations are appropriate; 10
and (c) what criteria are to be used in determining which state stat5. In dealing with the question, federal courts generally have employed one of
four categories of state statutes of limitations. Some federal courts have looked to the
time periods contained in the relevant state's tort claims act. See, e.g., Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677 (7th Cir. 1982); Kosikowski v. Bourne, 659 F.2d 105 (9th Cir. 1981);
DeVargas v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections, 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
Other courts have looked to the statutes of limitations governing contract or surety
bond actions. See, e.g., Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289 (5th Cir. 1976). Still other
courts have been guided by statutes relating to personal injuries. See, e.g., Garmon v.
Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Hamilton v. City of
Overland Park, 730 F.2d 613 (10th Cir. 1984). Finally, a few courts, such as Mismash
v. Murray City, 730 F.2d 1366 (10th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1052 (1985)
have relied upon a state's residual statute of limitations.
6. For a thorough analysis of the treatment given to the issue by each federal
circuit court through 1984, see Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir.
1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
7. Section 1988 states, in pertinent part, that:
The jurisdiction in civil and criminal matters conferred on the district courts
by the provisions of this Title ... for the protection of all persons in their civil
rights ... shall be exercised and enforced in conformity with the laws of the
United States, so far as such laws are suitable ... but in all cases where they
are not adapted to the object, or are deficient in the provisions necessary to
furnish suitable remedies and punish offenses against law, the common law, as
modified and changed by the constitution and statutes of the State wherein
the court ... is held, sd far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitution and laws of the United States, shall be extended to and govern the said
courts ....

42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982).
8. See Biehler, Limiting the Right to Sue: The Civil Rights Dilemma, 33 DRAKE
L. REV. 1, 7-8 (1983-84) (discussing the Supreme Court's early decision to borrow
state statutes in O'Sullivan v. Felix, 233 U.S. 318 (1914)).
9. See Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1985) (section 1983 is only procedural);
Monroe v. Pope, 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (section 1983 is both procedural and
substantive).
10. Cf. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
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ute of limitation is best suited to the case at hand."
Finally, in 1985 the Supreme Court seized the opportunity to
put an end to the "uncertainty and time-consuming litigation that is
foreign to the central purposes of section 1983. ' In Wilson v. Garcia,' 3 the Court, affirming a decision of the Court of Appeals for the
Tenth Circuit,"' decided that henceforth all section 1983 claims are
to be characterized as personal injury actions for statute of limitations purposes, regardless of the underlying cause of action.' 5
Although the Supreme Court's decision resolved the obvious
problem of choosing the appropriate statute of limitations when a
particular set of facts implicates more than one legal theory, it failed
to address at least four other serious problems. One such problem
stems from the diverse nature of section 1983 claims, as the Court
itself recognized.1 6 Another problem stems from the fact that most
personal injury actions have relatively short statutes of limitations. 7
There also is the problem that, unlike the former scheme in which
section 1983 claims were brought within the statute of limitations of
the most analogous state cause of action,"s the new rule announced
11. See generally Comment, Choice of Law Under Section 1983, 37 U. CHI. L.
REv. 494 (1970).
12. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 272.
13. Id. at 261.
14. Id. at 280.
15. Id. at 278. The Court's holding has generated much discussion. See, e.g.,
Kibble-Smith, Statutes of Limitation and Section 1983: Implications for Illinois
Civil Rights Law, 20 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 415 (1987); Pagan, Virginia's Statute of
Limitations for Section 1983 Claims after Wilson v. Garcia, 19 U. RICH. L. REv. 257
(1985); Note, Wilson v. Garcia and Statutes of Limitations in Section 1983 Actions:
Retroactive or ProspectiveApplication?, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 363 (1985); Note, Statutes of Limitations in Civil RICO Actions after Wilson v. Garcia, 55 FORDHAM L.
REV. 529 (1987); Note, The Retroactive Effect of Wilson v. Garcia, 20 IND. L. REV. 795
(1987); Comment, Civil Rights - Statutes of Limitations for Section 1983 Actions - A
Definitive Answer in Wilson v. Garcia?, 17 MEM. ST. U.L. REV. 127 (1986); Note, Civil
Rights: Determining the Appropriate Statute of Limitations for Section 1983
Claims, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 440 (1986); Note, Civil Rights - Statute of Limitations - State Limitation Period for Personal Injury Actions Applies to All Section
1983 Claims, 16 SETON HALL L. REV. 831 (1986); Recent Development, All Section
1983 Actions Must Apply A Single State Statute of Limitations, 15 STETSON L. REV.
1042 (1986); Note, A Step Toward Simplification with 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 18 U. TOL.
L. REV. 221 (1986); Note, Retroactive Application of Wilson v. Garcia: Continued
Confusion to a Troubled Topic, 44 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 135 (1987).
16. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 275.
17. For example, Colorado requires that actions for assault and battery or false
imprisonment be brought within one year. See McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367,
1369 (10th Cir. 1984) (citing COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-80-102 (1973)). In Indiana, the
period for commencing an action for injuries to a person or character or personal
property is two years. See Blake v. Katter, 693 F.2d 677, 679 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing
IND. CODE § 34-1-2-2 (1976)). Of course, it is unclear that these actually would be the
preferred statutes under Wilson. See infra text following note 41 for Justice
O'Connor's opinion on the issue of statute of limitations periods for personal injury
actions.
18. Prior to Wilson, two approaches had been developed for determining the
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by the Supreme Court requires section 1983 claims to be squeezed
into personal injury categories which never were intended by state
legislatures to include civil rights claims.' Finally, in jurisdictions
where there either are several or no limitations periods for personal
injury actions, the Supreme Court's decision leaves the matter as
muddled as before, if not more so.
In light of the foregoing, this essay will analyze two aspects of
Wilson. First, it will discuss the Supreme Court's decision to apply
one characterization to all section 1983 actions. Second, it will consider the Court's choice of personal injury as the singular characterization. Finally, after reviewing the Wilson dissent, the essay concludes by suggesting that the Wilson decision should be abandoned.
In its place, the Court should adopt the maritime doctrine of laches
in section 1983 cases. As will be shown, such a step would more fully
achieve Congress' purpose in enacting section 1983.

II. HISTORY OF Wilson v. Garcia
A.

The Decision of the District Court

Gary Garcia instituted a section 1983 action in the United
States District Court for the District of New Mexico, claiming that
his constitutional rights had been violated two years and nine
months earlier when he had been physically assaulted by a New
Mexico state police officer.2 He also asserted a claim against the
state police chief, alleging that the chief had failed to properly train
and supervise the officer.2" In the district court, the defendants
moved to dismiss on the grounds that Garcia's claim was time
barred by the two-year limitations period contained in the New
Mexico Tort Claims Act.2 Denying the defendants' motion, the district court held first, that all section 1983 actions should be unimost analogous state cause of action. The first approach asked which statute of limitation would have been applied had the claim been brought in state court rather than
federal court. The second and more favored approach involved a two-step inquiry.
First, the nature of the claim would be determined under federal law. Thereafter, the
state statutes of limitation would be scrutinized to determine the most appropriate
one. See also Shaw v. McCorkle, 537 F.2d 1289, 1292 (5th Cir. 1976).
19. See supra note 15 and accompanying text discussing the Wilson holding. As
the Supreme Court has recognized in the past, statutes of limitations reflect a state's
"value judgment concerning the point at which interests in favor of protecting valid
claims are outweighed by the interests in prohibiting the prosecution of stale ones."
Board of Regents v. Tomanio, 446 U.S. 478, 485 (1980) (quoting Johnson v. Railway
Express Agency, 421 U.S. 454, 463-64 (1975)).
20. Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d 640, 643-48 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261
(1985).
21. Id. at 642.
22. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 41-4-15 (1985).
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formly characterized,23 and second, that they should be characterized as actions based on the violation of a statute.2 4 In doing so, the
court found inapplicable DeVargas v. New Mexico Dep't of Corrections,2 a New Mexico state case which held that the New Mexico
Tort Claims Act was the most analogous to section 1983 and, therefore, the most appropriate for determining the applicable statute of
limitations.2
B.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit agreed
that a uniform characterization of all section 1983 actions was necessary to "effectuate the purposes of both the civil rights acts and
statutes of limitations."2 7 It disagreed, however, with the particular
characterization of section 1983 actions as violations of a statute,"
concluding, instead, that "every section 1983 claim is in essence an
action for injury to personal rights."'" As such, the appellate court
held that the New Mexico three-year statute of limitations for actions for injuries to person or reputation 0 applicable.2 "
C.

The Decision of the Supreme Court

1. The Majority Opinion
The Court of Appeals' decision subsequently was affirmed by
the Supreme Court. 2 The Court acknowledged that most section
1983 claims can be analogized to more than one state claim, and
that therefore more than one state statute of limitations would be
applicable. Thus, the Court maintained that Congress could not
have intended the inconsistencies that necessarily would follow from
an approach that looks to the underlying cause of action.3 Citing an
earlier Supreme Court section 1983 decision which had held that
borrowing state statutes under section 1988 does not require na23. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 650.
24. Because there was no New Mexico statute that was on point, the district
court applied New Mexico's residual limitations period. Id. at 651.
25. 97 N.M. 563, 642 P.2d 166 (1982).
26. The court of appeals disposed of DeVargas by determining that the characterization of section 1983 claims was a matter of federal, rather than state, law. The
Supreme Court agreed with this position. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 270-71.
27. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 649.
28. Id. at 651.
29. Id.
30. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 37-1-8 (1985).
31. Garcia, 731 F.2d at 651.
32. Garcia v. Wilson, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
33. Id. at 273-74.
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tional uniformity, the Wilson Court held that "uniformity [within
states], certainty and the minimization of unnecessary litigation all
support the conclusion that Congress favored [the single characterization] approach.""4
In addition, the Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals'
decision to categorize all section 1983 claims as personal injury actions. Placing the Civil Rights Act in its historical context, the Court
considered the climate of the South during the Reconstruction and
the harms Congress sought to remedy. In the course of its analysis,
the Court alternated between construing what Congress had intended in 1871 and what it would do if it were in session in 1985.
This analytic technique enabled the Court to find that in 1871 the
"atrocities that concerned Congress . . . plainly sounded in tort,"5
while, at the same time, to consider claims that Congress probably
did not foresee, such as the mistreatment of school children"6 and
the challenge to differing age limitations for the sale of beer to men
and women. 7 In conclusion, the Court held that "[hiad the 42nd
Congress expressly focused on the issue today, . . . it would have
characterized section 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries to personal rights." '
2.

The Dissent

Justice O'Connor penned a vehement dissent in which she disagreed with the majority's decision to place all section 1983 claims
under one banner.89 The grounds of her dissent were many. Justice
O'Connor claimed that the decision flew in the face of well-established precedent, violated the spirit of section 1988, overstepped judicial boundaries in an effort to legislate what the legislature had
failed to, and trespassed on states' rights.'0 As to the specific choice
of personal injury as the singular category, Justice O'Connor agreed
that the choice was appealing, but concluded that such a choice was
clearly erroneous."'
Most importantly, Justice O'Connor pointed out that the majority's opinion in fact did not solve anything, since the lower courts
still would have to locate the particular state statutes of limitations
that deal with personal injuries. Since some states, such as Colorado,
34. Id. at 275.
35. Id. at 277.
36. Id. at 273 (citing Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651 (1977)).
37. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 273 n.31.
38. Id. at 278.
39. Id. at 280.
40. Id. at 280-86.
41. Id. at 284. Under the majority's logic, virtually any claim brought on behalf
of an individual is for a personal injury.
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do not have statutes that are closely analogous, federal courts sitting
in such states would need to apply a residuary statute.42 By trying to
impose uniformity when "diversity is the natural order,"' s the majority, in the opinion of Justice O'Connor, chose a "poor substitute
for the careful selection of the appropriate state law analogy."""
III.

THE LACHES ALTERNATIVE

Recognizing that limitations on the time in which claims may
be brought are necessary, and that "even wrongdoers are entitled to
assume that their sins may be forgotten,"' 5 the question remains
whether statutes of limitations are the best or only method available
to prevent the bringing of stale claims. In searching for an alternative, one is struck by admiralty law which, in the absence of a congressionally-specified statute of limitations,"" employs the doctrine
47
of laches.
Under the admiralty doctrine of laches, the court decides
whether a claim is stale by determining whether the plaintiff has
slept on his rights and whether the defendant would be prejudiced
(such as by the inability to obtain documents or locate witnesses) if
the action were allowed to proceed. In determining whether the delay is unreasonable, the court looks to the federal or state statute of
42. Id. at 286-87 (discussing McKay v. Hammock, 730 F.2d 1367) (10th Cir.
1984).
43. Id. at 286.
44. Id. Justice O'Connor's lone dissent is particularly noteworthy in light of the
fact that the actual issue before the Court was the narrow one of which the New
Mexico statute was pertinent. Several years later, however, Justice O'Connor found
herself authoring the majority decision in Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff &
Assocs., Inc., 107 S. Ct. 2759 (1987). In that case, the Court held that the appropriate
statute of limitations in actions brought under the civil provisions of the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1982) was the
four year period specified in the civil enforcement section of the Clayton Act, 15
U.S.C. § 15 (1982). Agency Holding Corp., 10 at 2767. While claiming to recognize
that her position in Wilson had been rejected by "a clear majority of the Court,"
Justice O'Connor nevertheless used her dissent in Wilson as the basis on which to
hold that civil RICO suits should be analogized to violations of the Clayton Act. Id. at
2765.
45. Wilson, 471 U.S. at 271.
46. In a number of instances, Congress has enacted a specific statute of limitation for maritime cases. Thus, for example, personal injury and death actions arising
out of maritime torts are subject to a three year statute of limitations. 46 U.S.C. §
763a (1982). Jones Act suits also have a three year of statute of limitations. 45 U.S.C.
§ 56 (1982). Salvage claims have a two year statute. 46 U.S.C. § 730 (1982). There is
also a two year statute for actions instituted under the Suits in Admiralty Act. 46
U.S.C. § 745 (1982). Cargo claims brought pursuant to the Carriage of Goods by Sea
Act have a one year statute. 46 U.S.C. § 1303(6) (1982). Finally, a six month statute
applies to the filing of a suit to limit liability under the Limitation Act. 46 U.S.C. §
185 (1982).
47. Laches constitutes an affirmative defense and as such must be raised by the
defendant in the initial pleadings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 8(c).
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limitations which is most analogous. If the plaintiffs claim has been
filed after the running of the analogous statute, the plaintiff is given
an opportunity to prove that the delay was reasonable and that the
defendant will not be prejudiced by a decision to allow the suit to
proceed.48 On the other hand, if the plaintiff's claim has been filed
prior to the running of the prescribed period, then the defendant is
given an opportunity to demonstrate why the plaintiff's suit should
be dismissed because of undue delay or prejudice, or both.'
Over time, the maritime laches doctrine has shown itself to be
an invaluable tool.8 0 Rather than following a hard-and-fast rule,
laches commits to the trial court sufficient discretion to decide each
case on its own unique facts." In this way, both plaintiffs and defendants have the opportunity to inform the court of any circumstances which they believe justify a deviation from the usual
standard.
No other area of federal law seems more in need of this flexible
doctrine than that of civil rights.2 Rather than spending extraordinary amounts of time choosing appropriate state statutes of limitations, a system that both the majority and dissent in Wilson agree is
greatly flawed, 53 a federal judge could hear arguments from both
48. See, e.g., Gutierrez v. Waterman S.S. Co., 373 U.S. 206 (1963) (in personal
injury action by longshoreman, defendant did not suffer any prejudice by plaintiff's
delay in bringing suit). The leading case of who bears the burden of proof in laches
litigation is Larios v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 316 F.2d 63 (2d Cir. 1963).
49. See, e.g., Trivizas v. Tanjong Shipping Co., 1982 Am. Mar. Cas. 2520
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) (master of a ship who waited seventy days to bring personal injury
action against new owners of a vessel held barred by laches due to prejudice which
would be suffered by new owners having to defend such a suit).
50. See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 9-81, 774

(1975); T.

SCHOENBAUM, ADMIRALTY AND MARITIME LAW

§ 4-17, at 156 (1987).

51. The range of discretion enjoyed by trial judges in applying laches in modern
maritime cases was set out by the Supreme Court in Gardner v. Panama Railroad
Co., 342 U.S. 29 (1951). In that case the Court wrote:
Though the existence of laches is a question primarily addressed to the discretion of the trial court, the matter should not be determined merely by a reference to and a mechanical application of the statute of limitation. The equities
of the parties must be considered as well. Where there has been no inexcusable
delay in seeking a remedy abd where no prejudice to the defendant has ensued
from the mere passage of time, there should be no bar to relief.
Id. at 30-31. See also Czaplicki v. S.S. Hoegh Silvercloud, 351 U.S. 525 (1956); Albertson v. T.J. Stevenson & Co., 749 F.2d 223 (5th Cir. 1984); Akers v. State Marine
Lines, Inc., 344 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1965); Le Gate v. Panamolga, 221 F.2d 689 (2d Cir.
1955).
52. See Comment, supra note 11, at 497 n.18 (citing Pritchard v. Smith, 289
F.2d 153 (8th Cir. 1961) (suggesting that admiralty jurisdiction can serve as a basis
for fashioning a federal rule of limitations for section 1983 suits)). Like civil rights
law, the law of admiralty is grounded in the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
53. District court judges are spending inordinate amounts of time trying to select the appropriate statute of limitations because of the Wilson case, despite the fact
that the decision is not even five years old. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLIN, SECTION
1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES AND FEES 223 (1986 & 1988 Cum. Supp.).
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sides as to why the claim is or is not stale, why it was not brought
sooner, and why the defendant is prejudiced by the delay.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Although much has changed since the enactment of section
1983 more than a century ago, in some ways, almost nothing has
changed. Sadly, the need for this remedy is very much with us. Yet,
rather than expanding the remedy to fit our times, the Supreme
Court in Wilson curtailed a claimant's ability to pursue its constitutional rights by restricting the time for bringing a section 1983 action to that period provided for personal injury actions by the
states. Unless and until Congress successfully legislates a solution,"
courts should apply the flexible, workable, and proven doctrine of
laches. In order to be able to do so, the Supreme Court should abandon Wilson and adopt the maritime doctrine of laches at the earliest
opportunity.

54. The likelihood of Congress being able to reach a legislative solution, however, seems remote. A recent commentator pointed out that Congress has failed to
enact bills designed to provide section 1983 with a specific limitations period on two
separate occasions. See Note, Amending a Statute of Limitations for 42 U.S.C. §
1983: More Than "A Half Measure of Uniformity", 73 MINN. L. REV. 85, 119 (1988).
Despite this dismal history, the author of the Note closes by proposing what is described as a "Model Amendment" containing a three year limitations period. Id. at
115. The author argues that this model amendment is viable because, unlike previous
proposals, it only deals with the limitations question, and avoids the more politically
charged "remedial" aspects of section 1983. Id. at 119. In making this statement,
however, the author fails to appreciate the basic truth that even if it were possible to
separate the statute of limitations from the "remedial" aspects of the law, nothing
proposed to a political body can remain apolitical. Because every legislative proposal
will affect entrenched polity in some manner and to some degree, all legislative proposals are, from their birth, inherently political. Thus, the laches solution proposed
by this essay is a more realistic solution because it can be put into operation without
first having to endure a political firestorm.

